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Software Supply Chain

Dependencies, SBOMs, build provenance, and CI/CD security.

  1. Archive via Utility/term/archive-via-utility

    Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.

  2. Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools/term/compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools

    Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)(Citation: Bitdefender NPM Repositories Compromised 2021)(Citation: MANDVI Malicious npm and PyPI Packages Disguised) This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re registered by threat actors after being removed by adversaries.(Citation: The Hacker News PyPi Revival Hijack 2024) Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.(Citation: Ahmed Backdoors in Python and NPM Packages)(Citation: Meyer PyPI Supply Chain Attack Uncovered)(Citation: Checkmarx oss seo)

  3. Gather Victim Host Information/term/gather-victim-host-information

    Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).